High risk. Don't ship without significant remediation.
Scanned 5/3/2026, 7:37:08 PMยทCached resultยทFast Scanยท88 rulesยทHow we decide โ
AIVSS Score
High
Severity Breakdown
0
critical
14
high
108
medium
32
low
MCP Server Information
Findings
This package has a D security grade with 14 high-severity issues and 108 medium-severity issues, primarily concentrated in server configuration (67 findings), resource exhaustion (28 findings), and readiness concerns (32 findings). The presence of command injection vulnerabilities (6 findings), insecure deserialization, and tool poisoning risks indicates significant attack surface that could allow remote code execution or data manipulation. Installation is not recommended without substantial remediation of these security gaps.
No known CVEs found for this package or its dependencies.
Scan Details
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Showing 1โ30 of 34 findings
34 findings
Script uses os.system to execute subprocess command and write output to file, performing hidden SUBPROCESS and FILESYSTEM side effects.
Evidence
| 4 | # This script provides a platform-independent way of making the jupyter-book call (used in pyproject.toml) |
| 5 | folder = Path(__file__).parent |
| 6 | toc_file = folder / "_toc.yml" |
| 7 | cmd = f"jupyter-book toc from-project docs -e .rst -e .md -e .ipynb >{toc_file}" |
| 8 | print(cmd) |
| 9 | os.system(cmd) |
Remediation
Either remove the undeclared side effect or amend the tool description + input schema to disclose it. Add machine-readable `destructiveHint`, `networkHint`, `filesystemHint` annotations when the MCP spec supports them.
Function write_to_file performs FILESYSTEM side effects (creates directories, writes file, changes permissions) not disclosed in its name or docstring.
Evidence
| 21 | .. automodule:: {module_qualname} |
| 22 | :members: |
| 23 | :undoc-members: |
| 24 | """ |
| 25 | |
| 26 | |
| 27 | def index_template(package_name: str, doc_references: Optional[List[str]] = None, text_prefix=""): |
Remediation
Either remove the undeclared side effect or amend the tool description + input schema to disclose it. Add machine-readable `destructiveHint`, `networkHint`, `filesystemHint` annotations when the MCP spec supports them.
Unsafe deserialization primitive detected. pickle.load(s), yaml.load (without SafeLoader), marshal.load(s), and shelve.open execute arbitrary code when the input is attacker-controlled.
Evidence
| 171 | path = cls._get_persistence_path(hook) |
| 172 | try: |
| 173 | with open(path, "rb") as f: |
| 174 | return pickle.load(f) |
| 175 | except Exception: |
| 176 | return cls() |
Remediation
Replace pickle with json/msgpack or a schema-validated format (protobuf, cap'n proto). Use yaml.safe_load instead of yaml.load. Never deserialize data from an untrusted source with these APIs.
Unsafe deserialization primitive detected. pickle.load(s), yaml.load (without SafeLoader), marshal.load(s), and shelve.open execute arbitrary code when the input is attacker-controlled.
Evidence
| 68 | """ |
| 69 | with open(path, encoding=SERENA_FILE_ENCODING) as f: |
| 70 | yaml = _create_yaml(preserve_comments=True) |
| 71 | commented_map: CommentedMap | None = yaml.load(f) |
| 72 | if commented_map is None: # ruamel returns None for empty documents, but we want an empty CommentedMap |
| 73 | commented_map = CommentedMap() |
| 74 | normalise_yaml_comments(commented_map, comment_normalisation) |
Remediation
Replace pickle with json/msgpack or a schema-validated format (protobuf, cap'n proto). Use yaml.safe_load instead of yaml.load. Never deserialize data from an untrusted source with these APIs.
Command injection risk. Shell-execution sink called with interpolated / attacker-controllable input. Use list-arg subprocess with shell=False, or escape every variable via shlex.quote (Python) / shell-escape (Node).
Evidence
| 295 | for pattern in self.libRepo.ignoredFileGlobPatterns: |
| 296 | for path in glob.glob(pattern, recursive=True): |
| 297 | print("Restoring via git: %s" % path) |
| 298 | os.system("git checkout %s" % path) |
| 299 | |
| 300 | # restore directories that were backed up |
| 301 | for d in self.libRepo.fullyIgnoredUnversionedDirectories: |
Remediation
Replace shell-based execution with list-arg subprocess calls (shell=False) or escape every interpolated value with shlex.quote (Python) / shell-escape (Node). Treat every MCP tool input as hostile.
Command injection risk. Shell-execution sink called with interpolated / attacker-controllable input. Use list-arg subprocess with shell=False, or escape every variable via shlex.quote (Python) / shell-escape (Node).
Evidence
| 54 | def gitCommitWithMessageFromFile(commitMsgFilename): |
| 55 | if not os.path.exists(commitMsgFilename): |
| 56 | raise FileNotFoundError(f"{commitMsgFilename} not found in {os.path.abspath(os.getcwd())}") |
| 57 | os.system(f"git commit --file={commitMsgFilename}") |
| 58 | os.unlink(commitMsgFilename) |
Remediation
Replace shell-based execution with list-arg subprocess calls (shell=False) or escape every interpolated value with shlex.quote (Python) / shell-escape (Node). Treat every MCP tool input as hostile.
Command injection risk. Shell-execution sink called with interpolated / attacker-controllable input. Use list-arg subprocess with shell=False, or escape every variable via shlex.quote (Python) / shell-escape (Node).
Evidence
| 52 | if deploy: |
| 53 | user = os.getenv("HADES_USER") |
| 54 | assert user, "HADES_USER environment variable must be set to deploy news.json to Hades" |
| 55 | os.system(f"scp news/news.json {user}@hades:/var/www/html/oraios-software/serena_news.json") |
Remediation
Replace shell-based execution with list-arg subprocess calls (shell=False) or escape every interpolated value with shlex.quote (Python) / shell-escape (Node). Treat every MCP tool input as hostile.
Command injection risk. Shell-execution sink called with interpolated / attacker-controllable input. Use list-arg subprocess with shell=False, or escape every variable via shlex.quote (Python) / shell-escape (Node).
Evidence
| 49 | click.echo(f"Bumped version to {new_version}") |
| 50 | os.system("git add -u") |
| 51 | os.system(f'git commit -m "Release v{new_version}"') |
| 52 | os.system(f"git tag v{new_version}") |
| 53 | |
| 54 | |
| 55 | def find_repo_root() -> Path: |
Remediation
Replace shell-based execution with list-arg subprocess calls (shell=False) or escape every interpolated value with shlex.quote (Python) / shell-escape (Node). Treat every MCP tool input as hostile.
Command injection risk. Shell-execution sink called with interpolated / attacker-controllable input. Use list-arg subprocess with shell=False, or escape every variable via shlex.quote (Python) / shell-escape (Node).
Evidence
| 173 | self.restore_ignored_files(libRepo.rootPath) |
| 174 | |
| 175 | # make commit in lib repo |
| 176 | os.system("git add %s" % self.libRepo.libDirectory) |
| 177 | gitCommitWithMessageFromFile(COMMIT_MSG_FILENAME) |
| 178 | newSyncCommitIdLibRepo = call("git rev-parse HEAD").strip() |
Remediation
Replace shell-based execution with list-arg subprocess calls (shell=False) or escape every interpolated value with shlex.quote (Python) / shell-escape (Node). Treat every MCP tool input as hostile.
Command injection risk. Shell-execution sink called with interpolated / attacker-controllable input. Use list-arg subprocess with shell=False, or escape every variable via shlex.quote (Python) / shell-escape (Node).
Evidence
| 48 | os.system("uv lock") |
| 49 | click.echo(f"Bumped version to {new_version}") |
| 50 | os.system("git add -u") |
| 51 | os.system(f'git commit -m "Release v{new_version}"') |
| 52 | os.system(f"git tag v{new_version}") |
Remediation
Replace shell-based execution with list-arg subprocess calls (shell=False) or escape every interpolated value with shlex.quote (Python) / shell-escape (Node). Treat every MCP tool input as hostile.
Zip Slip risk. Archive extraction writes to a path built from the entry name without normalising against the extraction root. Resolve and validate each destination path before writing.
Evidence
| 481 | if not cls._is_safe_tar_member(member, target_dir): |
| 482 | log.error(f"Unsafe tar member detected (path traversal): {member.name}") |
| 483 | return False |
| 484 | tar.extractall(target_dir) |
| 485 | |
| 486 | elif archive_type == "zip": |
| 487 | with zipfile.ZipFile(archive_path, "r") as zip_ref: |
Remediation
Resolve each entry's destination with os.path.realpath / path.resolve and reject any result that does not start with the intended base directory. Prefer library APIs that enforce this by default (e.g. shutil.unpack_archive in Python 3.12+, or adm-zip's safe extract).
Install-time script pipes a remote download directly into a shell. Any `npm install` or `docker build` on this package will execute attacker-controlled code without review. Fetch a pinned artifact, verify a checksum, and invoke it explicitly โ or drop the hook entirely.
Evidence
| 27 | # Install nodejs |
| 28 | ENV NVM_VERSION=0.40.3 |
| 29 | ENV NODE_VERSION=22.18.0 |
| 30 | RUN curl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v${NVM_VERSION}/install.sh | bash |
| 31 | # standard location |
| 32 | ENV NVM_DIR=/root/.nvm |
| 33 | RUN . "$NVM_DIR/nvm.sh" && nvm install ${NODE_VERSION} |
Remediation
Prefer libraries that do not require install-time code execution: - Drop `postinstall`/`preinstall`/`prepare` scripts if the work can happen at runtime or build-time instead. - Ship pre-built native binaries rather than compiling via a custom `cmdclass` or `build_ext` override. - For Dockerfiles: replace `RUN curl โฆ | sh` with a pinned download + checksum verification + explicit `RUN` of a named script. - If the hook is unavoidable, document exactly what it does so downstream reviewers
Install-time script pipes a remote download directly into a shell. Any `npm install` or `docker build` on this package will execute attacker-controlled code without review. Fetch a pinned artifact, verify a checksum, and invoke it explicitly โ or drop the hook entirely.
Evidence
| 39 | ENV PATH="${PATH}:/root/.local/bin" |
| 40 | |
| 41 | # Install the latest version of uv |
| 42 | RUN curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh |
| 43 | |
| 44 | # Install Rust and rustup for rust-analyzer support (minimal profile) |
| 45 | ENV RUSTUP_HOME=/usr/local/rustup |
Remediation
Prefer libraries that do not require install-time code execution: - Drop `postinstall`/`preinstall`/`prepare` scripts if the work can happen at runtime or build-time instead. - Ship pre-built native binaries rather than compiling via a custom `cmdclass` or `build_ext` override. - For Dockerfiles: replace `RUN curl โฆ | sh` with a pinned download + checksum verification + explicit `RUN` of a named script. - If the hook is unavoidable, document exactly what it does so downstream reviewers
Install-time script pipes a remote download directly into a shell. Any `npm install` or `docker build` on this package will execute attacker-controlled code without review. Fetch a pinned artifact, verify a checksum, and invoke it explicitly โ or drop the hook entirely.
Evidence
| 45 | ENV RUSTUP_HOME=/usr/local/rustup |
| 46 | ENV CARGO_HOME=/usr/local/cargo |
| 47 | ENV PATH="${CARGO_HOME}/bin:${PATH}" |
| 48 | RUN curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y \ |
| 49 | --default-toolchain stable \ |
| 50 | --profile minimal \ |
| 51 | && rustup component add rust-analyzer |
Remediation
Prefer libraries that do not require install-time code execution: - Drop `postinstall`/`preinstall`/`prepare` scripts if the work can happen at runtime or build-time instead. - Ship pre-built native binaries rather than compiling via a custom `cmdclass` or `build_ext` override. - For Dockerfiles: replace `RUN curl โฆ | sh` with a pinned download + checksum verification + explicit `RUN` of a named script. - If the hook is unavoidable, document exactly what it does so downstream reviewers
Dockerfile never sets a non-root `USER` directive, so the CMD runs as root by default. Any RCE or library-level vulnerability exploited inside this container gets full privileges (MCP Top-10 R3). Add `USER <non-root>` before CMD / ENTRYPOINT in the final stage โ e.g. `USER 1000`, `USER nobody`, or `USER nonroot` on distroless.
Evidence
| 1 | # Base stage with common dependencies |
| 2 | FROM python:3.11-slim AS base |
| 3 | SHELL ["/bin/bash", "-c"] |
| 4 | |
| 5 | # Set environment variables to make Python print directly to the terminal and avoid .pyc files. |
| 6 | ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 |
| 7 | ENV PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 |
| 8 | |
| 9 | # Install system dependencies required for package manager and build tools. |
| 10 | # sudo, wget, zip needed for some assistants, like junie |
| 11 | RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \ |
| 12 | curl \ |
| 13 | build-essential \ |
| 14 | git \ |
| 15 | ssh \ |
| 16 | |
Remediation
Create and switch to a non-root user before the CMD / ENTRYPOINT: RUN adduser --system --uid 1000 app USER 1000 Or reuse the base image's shipped non-root account (e.g. `USER nobody`, `USER nonroot` on distroless). Multi-stage builds only need the USER directive in the final stage.
User-controlled value printed to terminal without ANSI escape sanitization. Malicious input can inject cursor-control sequences, rewrite earlier output, or hide shell commands from the operator.
Evidence
| 187 | execute('git add %s %s' % (self.SYNC_COMMIT_ID_FILE_LIB_REPO, self.SYNC_COMMIT_ID_FILE_THIS_REPO)) |
| 188 | execute(f'git commit -m "{self.SYNC_COMMIT_MESSAGE % self.libRepo.name} (pull)"') |
| 189 | |
| 190 | print(f"\n\nIf everything was successful, you should now push your changes to branch " |
| 191 | f"'{self.branch}'\nand get your branch merged into develop (issuing a pull request where appropriate)") |
| 192 | |
| 193 | def push(self, libRepo: "LibRepo"): |
| 194 | """ |
Remediation
Strip C0/C1 control codes before printing user-controlled values. Python: re.sub(r"[\x00-\x08\x0b-\x1f\x7f]", "", s). Prefer a structured logger (json/logfmt) over raw print to stdout.
Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure โ useful recon for attackers.
Evidence
| 355 | result_message = self._rename_memory(request_rename_memory) |
| 356 | return {"status": "success", "message": result_message} |
| 357 | except Exception as e: |
| 358 | return {"status": "error", "message": str(e)} |
| 359 | |
| 360 | @self._app.route("/get_serena_config", methods=["GET"]) |
| 361 | def get_serena_config() -> dict[str, Any]: |
Remediation
Log the full exception server-side with a correlation ID; return only {"error_id": id, "message": "internal error"} to the caller. Never enable Flask debug mode in production.
Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure โ useful recon for attackers.
Evidence
| 375 | self._save_serena_config(request_save_config) |
| 376 | return {"status": "success", "message": "Serena config saved successfully"} |
| 377 | except Exception as e: |
| 378 | return {"status": "error", "message": str(e)} |
| 379 | |
| 380 | @self._app.route("/queued_task_executions", methods=["GET"]) |
| 381 | def get_queued_executions() -> dict[str, Any]: |
Remediation
Log the full exception server-side with a correlation ID; return only {"error_id": id, "message": "internal error"} to the caller. Never enable Flask debug mode in production.
Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure โ useful recon for attackers.
Evidence
| 319 | result = self._get_memory(request_get_memory) |
| 320 | return result.model_dump() |
| 321 | except Exception as e: |
| 322 | return {"status": "error", "message": str(e)} |
| 323 | |
| 324 | @self._app.route("/save_memory", methods=["POST"]) |
| 325 | def save_memory() -> dict[str, str]: |
Remediation
Log the full exception server-side with a correlation ID; return only {"error_id": id, "message": "internal error"} to the caller. Never enable Flask debug mode in production.
Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure โ useful recon for attackers.
Evidence
| 384 | response = [QueuedExecution.from_task_info(task_info).model_dump() for task_info in current_executions] |
| 385 | return {"queued_executions": response, "status": "success"} |
| 386 | except Exception as e: |
| 387 | return {"status": "error", "message": str(e)} |
| 388 | |
| 389 | @self._app.route("/cancel_task_execution", methods=["POST"]) |
| 390 | def cancel_task_execution() -> dict[str, Any]: |
Remediation
Log the full exception server-side with a correlation ID; return only {"error_id": id, "message": "internal error"} to the caller. Never enable Flask debug mode in production.
Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure โ useful recon for attackers.
Evidence
| 363 | result = self._get_serena_config() |
| 364 | return result.model_dump() |
| 365 | except Exception as e: |
| 366 | return {"status": "error", "message": str(e)} |
| 367 | |
| 368 | @self._app.route("/save_serena_config", methods=["POST"]) |
| 369 | def save_serena_config() -> dict[str, str]: |
Remediation
Log the full exception server-side with a correlation ID; return only {"error_id": id, "message": "internal error"} to the caller. Never enable Flask debug mode in production.
Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure โ useful recon for attackers.
Evidence
| 410 | response = QueuedExecution.from_task_info(last_execution_info).model_dump() if last_execution_info is not None else None |
| 411 | return {"last_execution": response, "status": "success"} |
| 412 | except Exception as e: |
| 413 | return {"status": "error", "message": str(e)} |
| 414 | |
| 415 | @self._app.route("/fetch_unread_news", methods=["GET"]) |
| 416 | def fetch_unread_news() -> dict[str, dict[str, str] | str]: |
Remediation
Log the full exception server-side with a correlation ID; return only {"error_id": id, "message": "internal error"} to the caller. Never enable Flask debug mode in production.
Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure โ useful recon for attackers.
Evidence
| 343 | self._delete_memory(request_delete_memory) |
| 344 | return {"status": "success", "message": f"Memory {request_delete_memory.memory_name} deleted successfully"} |
| 345 | except Exception as e: |
| 346 | return {"status": "error", "message": str(e)} |
| 347 | |
| 348 | @self._app.route("/rename_memory", methods=["POST"]) |
| 349 | def rename_memory() -> dict[str, str]: |
Remediation
Log the full exception server-side with a correlation ID; return only {"error_id": id, "message": "internal error"} to the caller. Never enable Flask debug mode in production.
Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure โ useful recon for attackers.
Evidence
| 331 | self._save_memory(request_save_memory) |
| 332 | return {"status": "success", "message": f"Memory {request_save_memory.memory_name} saved successfully"} |
| 333 | except Exception as e: |
| 334 | return {"status": "error", "message": str(e)} |
| 335 | |
| 336 | @self._app.route("/delete_memory", methods=["POST"]) |
| 337 | def delete_memory() -> dict[str, str]: |
Remediation
Log the full exception server-side with a correlation ID; return only {"error_id": id, "message": "internal error"} to the caller. Never enable Flask debug mode in production.
Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure โ useful recon for attackers.
Evidence
| 307 | self._remove_language(request_remove_language) |
| 308 | return {"status": "success", "message": f"Language {request_remove_language.language} removed successfully"} |
| 309 | except Exception as e: |
| 310 | return {"status": "error", "message": str(e)} |
| 311 | |
| 312 | @self._app.route("/get_memory", methods=["POST"]) |
| 313 | def get_memory() -> dict[str, Any]: |
Remediation
Log the full exception server-side with a correlation ID; return only {"error_id": id, "message": "internal error"} to the caller. Never enable Flask debug mode in production.
Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure โ useful recon for attackers.
Evidence
| 447 | self._read_news.mark_read(news_snippet_id) |
| 448 | return {"status": "success", "message": f"Marked news snippet {news_snippet_id} as read"} |
| 449 | except Exception as e: |
| 450 | return {"status": "error", "message": str(e)} |
| 451 | |
| 452 | def _get_log_messages(self, request_log: RequestLog) -> ResponseLog: |
| 453 | messages = self._memory_log_handler.get_log_messages(from_idx=request_log.start_idx) |
Remediation
Log the full exception server-side with a correlation ID; return only {"error_id": id, "message": "internal error"} to the caller. Never enable Flask debug mode in production.
Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure โ useful recon for attackers.
Evidence
| 381 | return {"path": path, "results": search_results, "error": None} |
| 382 | except Exception as e: |
| 383 | log.debug(f"Error processing {path}: {e}") |
| 384 | return {"path": path, "results": [], "error": str(e)} |
| 385 | |
| 386 | # Execute in parallel using joblib |
| 387 | results = Parallel( |
Remediation
Log the full exception server-side with a correlation ID; return only {"error_id": id, "message": "internal error"} to the caller. Never enable Flask debug mode in production.
Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure โ useful recon for attackers.
Evidence
| 401 | "message": f"Task with id {escape(request_data.get('task_id'))} not found, maybe execution was already finished", |
| 402 | } |
| 403 | except Exception as e: |
| 404 | return {"status": "error", "message": str(e), "was_cancelled": False} |
| 405 | |
| 406 | @self._app.route("/last_execution", methods=["GET"]) |
| 407 | def get_last_execution() -> dict[str, Any]: |
Remediation
Log the full exception server-side with a correlation ID; return only {"error_id": id, "message": "internal error"} to the caller. Never enable Flask debug mode in production.
Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure โ useful recon for attackers.
Evidence
| 295 | self._add_language(request_add_language) |
| 296 | return {"status": "success", "message": f"Language {request_add_language.language} added successfully"} |
| 297 | except Exception as e: |
| 298 | return {"status": "error", "message": str(e)} |
| 299 | |
| 300 | @self._app.route("/remove_language", methods=["POST"]) |
| 301 | def remove_language() -> dict[str, str]: |
Remediation
Log the full exception server-side with a correlation ID; return only {"error_id": id, "message": "internal error"} to the caller. Never enable Flask debug mode in production.
Silent error swallowing detected. An except clause that does pass or ... discards the exception with no log, no metric, and no trace. This blinds incident response and hides real failures.
Evidence
| 279 | # Signal children first |
| 280 | for child in parent.children(recursive=True): |
| 281 | try: |
| 282 | getattr(child, signal_method)() |
| 283 | except (psutil.NoSuchProcess, psutil.AccessDenied, Exception): |
| 284 | pass |
| 285 | |
| 286 | # Then signal the parent |
| 287 | try: |
Remediation
Log the exception at minimum (`logger.exception(e)`), emit a metric, or re-raise if the error is not recoverable. If you genuinely want to ignore an exception, say so with a comment.
Silent error swallowing detected. An except clause that does pass or ... discards the exception with no log, no metric, and no trace. This blinds incident response and hides real failures.
Evidence
| 628 | # Clean up temp directory |
| 629 | if os.path.exists(temp_dir): |
| 630 | try: |
| 631 | shutil.rmtree(temp_dir) |
| 632 | except Exception: |
| 633 | pass |
| 634 | |
| 635 | return False |
Remediation
Log the exception at minimum (`logger.exception(e)`), emit a metric, or re-raise if the error is not recoverable. If you genuinely want to ignore an exception, say so with a comment.
Silent error swallowing detected. An except clause that does pass or ... discards the exception with no log, no metric, and no trace. This blinds incident response and hides real failures.
Evidence
| 269 | children = parent.children(recursive=True) |
| 270 | for child in children: |
| 271 | try: |
| 272 | child.terminate() |
| 273 | except (psutil.NoSuchProcess, psutil.AccessDenied): |
| 274 | pass |
| 275 | psutil.wait_procs(children, timeout=2) |
| 276 | for child in children: |
| 277 | try: |
Remediation
Log the exception at minimum (`logger.exception(e)`), emit a metric, or re-raise if the error is not recoverable. If you genuinely want to ignore an exception, say so with a comment.
Silent error swallowing detected. An except clause that does pass or ... discards the exception with no log, no metric, and no trace. This blinds incident response and hides real failures.
Evidence
| 54 | self._log_buffer.append(msg) |
| 55 | for callback in self._emit_callbacks: |
| 56 | try: |
| 57 | callback(msg) |
| 58 | except: |
| 59 | pass |
| 60 | self._log_queue.task_done() |
| 61 | except queue.Empty: |
| 62 | continue |
Remediation
Log the exception at minimum (`logger.exception(e)`), emit a metric, or re-raise if the error is not recoverable. If you genuinely want to ignore an exception, say so with a comment.
Silent error swallowing detected. An except clause that does pass or ... discards the exception with no log, no metric, and no trace. This blinds incident response and hides real failures.
Evidence
| 292 | with open(gemfile_path) as f: |
| 293 | content = f.read().lower() |
| 294 | if "gem 'rails'" in content or 'gem "rails"' in content: |
| 295 | return True |
| 296 | except Exception: |
| 297 | pass |
| 298 | |
| 299 | return False |
Remediation
Log the exception at minimum (`logger.exception(e)`), emit a metric, or re-raise if the error is not recoverable. If you genuinely want to ignore an exception, say so with a comment.