High risk. Don't ship without significant remediation.
Scanned 5/16/2026, 7:14:49 AMยทCached resultยทDeep Scanยท91 rulesยทHow we decide โ
AIVSS Score
High
Severity Breakdown
0
critical
13
high
6
medium
7
low
MCP Server Information
Findings
This package carries significant security concerns with a D grade and 63/100 safety score, driven primarily by 13 high-severity findings across prompt injection vulnerabilities (8 instances) and readiness issues (7 instances). The prompt injection risks are particularly problematic for an MCP server, as they could allow attackers to manipulate tool behavior or extract unintended information through crafted inputs. You should address these vulnerabilities or implement strict input validation before deploying this in production environments.
AIPer-finding remediation generated by bedrock-claude-haiku-4-5 โ 21 of 26 findings. Click any finding to read.
No known CVEs found for this package or its dependencies.
Scan Details
Done
Sign in to save scan history and re-scan automatically on new commits.
Building your own MCP server?
Same rules, same LLM judges, same grade. Private scans stay isolated to your account and never appear in the public registry. Required for code your team hasnโt shipped yet.
26 of 26 findings
26 findings
Tool delete_node accepts node_id identifier and deletes matching record without verifying caller ownership or authorization; missing principal-derived predicate such as owner_id or tenant_id filter.
Evidence
| 1 | import asyncio |
| 2 | import httpx |
| 3 | import json |
| 4 | import logging |
RemediationAI
The get_node_details tool returns data for any node matching the supplied node_id without checking whether the caller has permission to view that node. Add a principal-derived authorization filter by extracting the caller's user_id or tenant_id from the MCP context and querying only nodes where `owner_id = caller_user_id` (or equivalent tenant check). This prevents information disclosure of nodes the caller does not own. Verify by requesting details for a node owned by a different user and confirm the response is a 403 Forbidden or 404 Not Found.
Tool update_node accepts node_id identifier and updates matching record without verifying caller ownership or authorization; missing principal-derived predicate such as owner_id or tenant_id filter.
Evidence
| 1 | import asyncio |
| 2 | import httpx |
| 3 | import json |
| 4 | import logging |
RemediationAI
The get_node_details tool returns data for any node matching the supplied node_id without checking whether the caller has permission to view that node. Add a principal-derived authorization filter by extracting the caller's user_id or tenant_id from the MCP context and querying only nodes where `owner_id = caller_user_id` (or equivalent tenant check). This prevents information disclosure of nodes the caller does not own. Verify by requesting details for a node owned by a different user and confirm the response is a 403 Forbidden or 404 Not Found.
Tool disconnect_nodes accepts source_id and target_id identifiers and removes connection without verifying caller ownership or authorization of the nodes; missing principal-derived predicate.
Evidence
| 1 | import asyncio |
| 2 | import httpx |
| 3 | import json |
| 4 | import logging |
RemediationAI
The get_node_details tool returns data for any node matching the supplied node_id without checking whether the caller has permission to view that node. Add a principal-derived authorization filter by extracting the caller's user_id or tenant_id from the MCP context and querying only nodes where `owner_id = caller_user_id` (or equivalent tenant check). This prevents information disclosure of nodes the caller does not own. Verify by requesting details for a node owned by a different user and confirm the response is a 403 Forbidden or 404 Not Found.
Tool connect_nodes accepts source_id and target_id identifiers and creates connection without verifying caller ownership or authorization of the nodes; missing principal-derived predicate.
Evidence
| 1 | import asyncio |
| 2 | import httpx |
| 3 | import json |
| 4 | import logging |
RemediationAI
The get_node_details tool returns data for any node matching the supplied node_id without checking whether the caller has permission to view that node. Add a principal-derived authorization filter by extracting the caller's user_id or tenant_id from the MCP context and querying only nodes where `owner_id = caller_user_id` (or equivalent tenant check). This prevents information disclosure of nodes the caller does not own. Verify by requesting details for a node owned by a different user and confirm the response is a 403 Forbidden or 404 Not Found.
Tool get_node_details accepts node_id identifier and fetches matching record without verifying caller ownership or authorization; missing principal-derived predicate such as owner_id or tenant_id filter.
Evidence
| 1 | import asyncio |
| 2 | import httpx |
| 3 | import json |
| 4 | import logging |
RemediationAI
The get_node_details tool returns data for any node matching the supplied node_id without checking whether the caller has permission to view that node. Add a principal-derived authorization filter by extracting the caller's user_id or tenant_id from the MCP context and querying only nodes where `owner_id = caller_user_id` (or equivalent tenant check). This prevents information disclosure of nodes the caller does not own. Verify by requesting details for a node owned by a different user and confirm the response is a 403 Forbidden or 404 Not Found.
Tool _make_request uses shared authentication token from _get_auth_token() which reads from environment variable SAND_MARTIN_TOKEN or temp file, ignoring per-caller identity when making requests to Sand Martin C# Host at HOST_URL.
Evidence
| 70 | return f.read().strip() |
| 71 | except Exception as e: |
| 72 | logger.warning(f"Failed to read token file: {e}") |
| 73 | |
| 74 | return None |
| 75 | |
| 76 | async def _make_request(method: str, endpoint: str, data: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None) -> str: |
RemediationAI
The _make_request function uses a shared module-level authentication token from _get_auth_token() that reads SAND_MARTIN_TOKEN environment variable or a temp file, ignoring per-caller identity when making HTTP requests to the Sand Martin C# Host. Modify _make_request to accept a caller_token parameter (extracted from the MCP request context) and pass it in the Authorization header instead of the shared token: `headers={'Authorization': f'Bearer {caller_token}'}`. This ensures each request is authenticated as the actual caller, not a shared service account. Verify by logging the Authorization header value and confirming it reflects the per-request caller's credentials.
Tool get_canvas_state (and related tools create_node, update_node, delete_node, connect_nodes, disconnect_nodes) use shared authentication token from module-level _get_auth_token() function that reads SAND_MARTIN_TOKEN environment variable or temp file, without consulting per-request caller credentials.
Evidence
| 27 | Sand Martin Host in Rhino. |
| 28 | |
| 29 | The authentication uses the 'Bearer' token format in the HTTP Authorization header: |
| 30 | `Authorization: Bearer <YOUR_TOKEN>` |
| 31 | |
| 32 | Example manual verification: |
| 33 | `curl -X GET http://127.0.0.1:8081/state -H "Authorization: Bearer <YOUR_TOKEN>"` |
RemediationAI
The get_canvas_state, create_node, update_node, delete_node, connect_nodes, and disconnect_nodes tools all use a shared module-level authentication token from _get_auth_token() without consulting per-request caller credentials. Refactor each tool to accept the caller's token from the MCP request context (via mcp.request.metadata or similar) and pass it to _make_request instead of relying on the shared environment variable token. This ensures all operations are authenticated as the actual caller. Test by invoking each tool with different user credentials and confirming the Authorization header reflects the correct per-caller token.
Tool `_get_auth_token` performs FILESYSTEM side effects (reads from temporary file at `sand_martin.token`) not disclosed in description or function name.
Evidence
| 1 | import asyncio |
| 2 | import httpx |
| 3 | import json |
| 4 | import logging |
RemediationAI
The _make_request function performs network side effects (outbound HTTP requests to Sand Martin C# Host) that are not disclosed in its name or docstring. Add a detailed docstring that explicitly documents the network call: `"""Makes HTTP request to Sand Martin Host at HOST_URL. Side effects: outbound network request. Returns response text or raises httpx.HTTPError."""`. Consider renaming to _http_request_to_sand_martin for clarity. This ensures callers understand the function has external dependencies and network latency. Verify by reading the docstring and confirming it clearly states the network side effect.
Tool `_make_request` performs NETWORK side effects (outbound HTTP requests to Sand Martin C# Host) not disclosed in function name or docstring.
Evidence
| 1 | import asyncio |
| 2 | import httpx |
| 3 | import json |
| 4 | import logging |
RemediationAI
The _make_request function performs network side effects (outbound HTTP requests to Sand Martin C# Host) that are not disclosed in its name or docstring. Add a detailed docstring that explicitly documents the network call: `"""Makes HTTP request to Sand Martin Host at HOST_URL. Side effects: outbound network request. Returns response text or raises httpx.HTTPError."""`. Consider renaming to _http_request_to_sand_martin for clarity. This ensures callers understand the function has external dependencies and network latency. Verify by reading the docstring and confirming it clearly states the network side effect.
FastMCP server 'sand-martin' instructions contain imperative directives to the LLM: 'MUST first ask', 'should write', 'ask the user', 'identify', 'Call' โ instructing the agent on workflow and decision-making rather than describing tool behavior.
Evidence
| 15 | stream=sys.stderr |
| 16 | ) |
| 17 | logger = logging.getLogger("sand-martin") |
| 18 | |
| 19 | # Initialize FastMCP server |
| 20 | mcp = FastMCP( |
| 21 | "sand-martin", |
| 22 | instructions=""" |
| 23 | Securely orchestrates the Grasshopper canvas within Rhino using the Sand Martin Host. |
| 24 | |
| 25 | SECURITY & AUTHENTICATION: |
| 26 | This server requires a random 32-character 'shared secret' token generated by the |
| 27 | Sand Martin Host in Rhino. |
| 28 | |
| 29 | The authentication uses the 'Bearer' token format in the HTTP Authorization header: |
| 30 | `Authorizatio |
RemediationAI
The FastMCP server instructions contain imperative directives ('MUST first ask', 'should write', 'ask the user', 'identify', 'Call') that steer LLM agent behavior and decision-making rather than describing tool capabilities. Replace imperative workflow instructions with declarative tool descriptions: remove 'MUST', 'should', 'ask the user' and instead write 'This server provides tools to create, update, delete, and connect nodes. Each tool requires authentication via Bearer token.' This prevents the instructions from manipulating agent behavior at runtime. Verify by reviewing the instructions and confirming they describe tool behavior without imperative directives.
The 'sand-martin' MCP tool fetches per-call instructions from the FastMCP server initialization that embed dynamic behavior guidance for AI agents, including authentication workflows and canvas manipulation instructions that steer agent behavior at runtime.
Evidence
| 15 | stream=sys.stderr |
| 16 | ) |
| 17 | logger = logging.getLogger("sand-martin") |
| 18 | |
| 19 | # Initialize FastMCP server |
| 20 | mcp = FastMCP( |
| 21 | "sand-martin", |
| 22 | instructions=""" |
| 23 | Securely orchestrates the Grasshopper canvas within Rhino using the Sand Martin Host. |
| 24 | |
| 25 | SECURITY & AUTHENTICATION: |
| 26 | This server requires a random 32-character 'shared secret' token generated by the |
| 27 | Sand Martin Host in Rhino. |
| 28 | |
| 29 | The authentication uses the 'Bearer' token format in the HTTP Authorization header: |
| 30 | `Authorizatio |
RemediationAI
The FastMCP server initialization embeds dynamic behavior guidance in the instructions field that steers AI agent workflows and authentication handling at runtime, creating a vector for prompt injection or agent manipulation. Move all security-critical guidance (authentication requirements, authorization rules, rate limits) out of the instructions field and into tool-level docstrings and parameter validation logic. Keep instructions minimal and declarative: 'This server orchestrates Grasshopper canvas operations.' This prevents runtime instruction injection from affecting agent behavior. Verify by confirming the instructions field contains only static, declarative text without workflow directives.
The Sand Martin MCP server fetches untrusted JSON responses from an external C# Host (via HTTP requests to HOST_URL endpoints) and returns them verbatim to the LLM without provenance delimiters. Functions like get_canvas_state(), get_node_details(), and others return raw JSON strings from the remote host, enabling indirect prompt injection if the host is compromised or returns malicious content.
Evidence
| 1 | import asyncio |
| 2 | import httpx |
| 3 | import json |
| 4 | import logging |
| 5 | import sys |
| 6 | import os |
| 7 | import tempfile |
| 8 | from typing import Optional, Dict, Any |
| 9 | from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP |
| 10 | |
| 11 | # Configure logging to stderr (required for MCP servers as stdout is used for communication) |
| 12 | logging.basicConfig( |
| 13 | level=logging.INFO, |
| 14 | format="%(asctime)s - %(name)s - %(levelname)s - %(message)s", |
| 15 | stream=sys.stderr |
| 16 | ) |
| 17 | logger = logging.getLogger("sand-martin") |
| 18 | |
| 19 | # Initialize FastMCP server |
| 20 | mcp = FastMCP( |
| 21 | "sand-mart |
RemediationAI
The Sand Martin MCP server fetches untrusted JSON responses from an external C# Host and returns them verbatim to the LLM without provenance delimiters, enabling indirect prompt injection if the host is compromised. Wrap all responses from the remote host with explicit provenance markers: `return f'[SAND_MARTIN_HOST_RESPONSE] {json_response} [/SAND_MARTIN_HOST_RESPONSE]'` and validate the JSON structure before returning. Additionally, sanitize any string fields that might contain prompt-injection payloads. This makes the external origin explicit and limits injection surface. Verify by injecting malicious JSON into a mocked Sand Martin Host response and confirming the LLM receives it wrapped with provenance delimiters.
MCP tool with a destructive-sounding name is registered without the `destructiveHint: true` annotation. Clients rely on this hint to gate user confirmation, so the model may invoke the tool silently. Add `{ annotations: { destructiveHint: true } }` (TS) or `destructive_hint=True` on the tool decorator (Python).
Evidence
| 1 | import asyncio |
| 2 | import httpx |
| 3 | import json |
| 4 | import logging |
| 5 | import sys |
| 6 | import os |
| 7 | import tempfile |
| 8 | from typing import Optional, Dict, Any |
| 9 | from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP |
| 10 | |
| 11 | # Configure logging to stderr (required for MCP servers as stdout is used for communication) |
| 12 | logging.basicConfig( |
| 13 | level=logging.INFO, |
| 14 | format="%(asctime)s - %(name)s - %(levelname)s - %(message)s", |
| 15 | stream=sys.stderr |
| 16 | ) |
| 17 | logger = logging.getLogger("sand-martin") |
| 18 | |
| 19 | # Initialize FastMCP server |
| 20 | mcp = FastMCP( |
| 21 | "sand-mart |
RemediationAI
The delete_node, update_node, disconnect_nodes, and connect_nodes tools have destructive-sounding names but are not annotated with the destructiveHint flag, allowing the LLM to invoke them silently without user confirmation. Add `destructive_hint=True` to the @mcp.tool decorator for each destructive tool: `@mcp.tool(description='...', destructive_hint=True)`. This signals to MCP clients that these operations require user confirmation before execution. Verify by checking that an MCP client (e.g., Claude Desktop) displays a confirmation prompt before invoking a tool decorated with destructive_hint=True.
LLM consensus
MCP manifest declares tools but no authentication field is present (none of: auth, authorization, bearer, oauth, mtls, apiKey, api_key, basic, token, authToken). Absence is a weak signal โ confirm whether the server relies on network-layer or host-level auth, or declare the real mechanism explicitly so reviewers can audit it.
Evidence
| 1 | Metadata-Version: 2.4 |
| 2 | Name: sand-martin |
| 3 | Version: 0.2.1 |
| 4 | Summary: An MCP server for generating and managing Grasshopper Python components |
| 5 | Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/LeoYuanjieLi/sand-martin |
| 6 | Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/LeoYuanjieLi/sand-martin/issues |
| 7 | Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/LeoYuanjieLi/sand-martin |
| 8 | Author-email: Leo Li <pbleoli@gmail.com> |
| 9 | License: Apache-2.0 |
| 10 | License-File: LICENSE |
| 11 | Keywords: architecture,automation,grasshopper,llm,mcp,rhino |
| 12 | Classifier: D |
RemediationAI
The MCP manifest (PKG-INFO) declares tools but does not specify an authentication mechanism, leaving reviewers unable to audit security controls. Add an explicit authentication field to the package metadata or create a SECURITY.md file documenting the authentication scheme: 'Authentication: Bearer token via SAND_MARTIN_TOKEN environment variable or sand_martin.token file. Per-caller tokens must be passed in MCP request context.' This makes the authentication model auditable. Verify by confirming the authentication mechanism is documented and matches the actual implementation.
MCP manifest declares tools but no authentication field is present (none of: auth, authorization, bearer, oauth, mtls, apiKey, api_key, basic, token, authToken). Absence is a weak signal โ confirm whether the server relies on network-layer or host-level auth, or declare the real mechanism explicitly so reviewers can audit it.
Evidence
| 1 | # <img src="assets/icon.png" width="32" height="32"> Sand Martin |
| 2 | |
| 3 | Sand Martin is an MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that enables real-time orchestration of the Grasshopper canvas within Rhino. It allows Large Language Models (like Claude) to create components, inject Python code, and wire nodes together directly in a live Grasshopper session. |
| 4 | |
| 5 | ## Demo |
| 6 | |
| 7 | ### 1. Authenticate with the Agent |
| 8 |  |
| 9 | |
| 10 | ### 2. Update Slider Values |
| 11 |  and branches (`@main`) are mutable โ a compromised maintainer or a tag rewrite can substitute malicious code into your CI pipeline silently. Pin to a SHA: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab`. For readability, include the version as a trailing comment: `# v4.1.1`. Tools like `pinact` / `ratchet` automate this. Allowed unpinned forms (excluded by the rule): - Local actions `.
Evidence
| 17 | - uses: actions/checkout@v4 |
| 18 | |
| 19 | - name: Set up Python |
| 20 | uses: actions/setup-python@v5 |
| 21 | with: |
| 22 | python-version: "3.10" |
RemediationAI
The GitHub Actions workflow uses `actions/checkout@v4` which is a mutable tag that can be rewritten by a compromised maintainer, allowing malicious code injection into the CI pipeline. Pin the action to a specific commit SHA: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab # v4.1.1`. Use tools like `pinact` or `ratchet` to automate SHA pinning. This ensures the exact version of the action is used and prevents supply-chain attacks. Verify by confirming the workflow file contains only pinned SHA references and no mutable tags.
GitHub Actions `uses:` reference is not pinned to a 40-character commit SHA. Tags (`@v4`) and branches (`@main`) are mutable โ a compromised maintainer or a tag rewrite can substitute malicious code into your CI pipeline silently. Pin to a SHA: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab`. For readability, include the version as a trailing comment: `# v4.1.1`. Tools like `pinact` / `ratchet` automate this. Allowed unpinned forms (excluded by the rule): - Local actions `.
Evidence
| 14 | id-token: write |
| 15 | |
| 16 | steps: |
| 17 | - uses: actions/checkout@v4 |
| 18 | |
| 19 | - name: Set up Python |
| 20 | uses: actions/setup-python@v5 |
RemediationAI
The GitHub Actions workflow uses `actions/setup-python@v5` which is a mutable tag that can be rewritten, allowing malicious code injection. Pin to a specific commit SHA: `uses: actions/setup-python@8f312734cc8431c50696c52d10e6fde8b49db3d8 # v5.0.0`. This prevents tag rewriting attacks. Verify by confirming the workflow file contains only pinned SHA references.
GitHub Actions `uses:` reference is not pinned to a 40-character commit SHA. Tags (`@v4`) and branches (`@main`) are mutable โ a compromised maintainer or a tag rewrite can substitute malicious code into your CI pipeline silently. Pin to a SHA: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab`. For readability, include the version as a trailing comment: `# v4.1.1`. Tools like `pinact` / `ratchet` automate this. Allowed unpinned forms (excluded by the rule): - Local actions `.
Evidence
| 28 | run: python3 -m build |
| 29 | |
| 30 | - name: Publish distribution ๐ฆ to PyPI |
| 31 | uses: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1 |
| 32 | with: |
| 33 | # Note: Trusted Publishing (no password required) must be configured on PyPI first. |
| 34 | # See: https://docs.pypi.org/trusted-publishers/ |
RemediationAI
The GitHub Actions workflow uses `pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1` which is a mutable branch reference that can be rewritten. Pin to a specific commit SHA: `uses: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@e53eb8b47601917af7b433337f2b912456d141898 # release/v1`. This prevents branch rewriting attacks. Verify by confirming all action references use pinned SHAs.
Time-of-check-to-time-of-use race. Code calls `os.path.exists` / `fs.existsSync` to check a path, then `open` / `readFileSync` / `unlink` on the same name within a few lines โ without a lock or atomic-open. An attacker who can race the filesystem (symlink, file replacement) between the check and the use gets the action applied to a different target. Replace the check-then-use pattern with the action's own error handling: try the open and catch FileNotFoundError / ENOENT. For atomic creation use
Evidence
| 1 | import asyncio |
| 2 | import httpx |
| 3 | import json |
| 4 | import logging |
| 5 | import sys |
| 6 | import os |
| 7 | import tempfile |
| 8 | from typing import Optional, Dict, Any |
| 9 | from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP |
| 10 | |
| 11 | # Configure logging to stderr (required for MCP servers as stdout is used for communication) |
| 12 | logging.basicConfig( |
| 13 | level=logging.INFO, |
| 14 | format="%(asctime)s - %(name)s - %(levelname)s - %(message)s", |
| 15 | stream=sys.stderr |
| 16 | ) |
| 17 | logger = logging.getLogger("sand-martin") |
| 18 | |
| 19 | # Initialize FastMCP server |
| 20 | mcp = FastMCP( |
| 21 | "sand-mart |
RemediationAI
The code performs a time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) race by calling `os.path.exists` to check a path, then opening or reading the same path without a lock, allowing an attacker to race a symlink or file replacement between the check and use. Replace the check-then-use pattern with direct error handling: remove the `os.path.exists` call and wrap the file operation in a try-except block catching FileNotFoundError. For example: `try: f = open(path); except FileNotFoundError: handle_error()`. This makes the operation atomic and race-free. Verify by attempting to race a symlink replacement during file access and confirming the operation fails safely or accesses the intended file.
LLM consensus
Silent error swallowing detected. An except clause that does pass or ... discards the exception with no log, no metric, and no trace. This blinds incident response and hides real failures.
Evidence
| 18 | { |
| 19 | return GetRhinoNodeDetails(nodeId); |
| 20 | } |
| 21 | } catch { |
| 22 | } |
| 23 | |
| 24 | return Task.FromResult(JsonConvert.SerializeObject(new { status = "error", message = "No active Grasshopper document" })); |
| 25 | } |
RemediationAI
The NodeManager.cs catch block silently swallows exceptions with no logging, preventing incident response and hiding real failures. Replace `catch { }` with `catch (Exception ex) { logger.Error($"Error in GetNodeDetails: {ex.Message}", ex); }` to log the exception with full context. This enables debugging and monitoring. Verify by triggering an error condition and confirming the exception is logged with timestamp and stack trace.
Silent error swallowing detected. An except clause that does pass or ... discards the exception with no log, no metric, and no trace. This blinds incident response and hides real failures.
Evidence
| 16 | { |
| 17 | return CreateRhinoConnection(request); |
| 18 | } |
| 19 | } catch { |
| 20 | } |
| 21 | |
| 22 | return Task.FromResult(JsonConvert.SerializeObject(new { status = "error", message = "No active Grasshopper document" })); |
| 23 | } |
RemediationAI
The ConnectionManager.cs catch block silently swallows exceptions with no logging. Replace `catch { }` with `catch (Exception ex) { logger.Error($"Error in CreateConnection: {ex.Message}", ex); }`. This enables visibility into connection failures. Verify by triggering an error and confirming it is logged.
Silent error swallowing detected. An except clause that does pass or ... discards the exception with no log, no metric, and no trace. This blinds incident response and hides real failures.
Evidence
| 17 | { |
| 18 | return GetRhinoCanvasState(); |
| 19 | } |
| 20 | } catch { |
| 21 | } |
| 22 | |
| 23 | return Task.FromResult(JsonConvert.SerializeObject(new { nodes = new List<NodeInfo>() })); |
| 24 | } |
RemediationAI
The StateManager.cs catch block silently swallows exceptions with no logging. Replace `catch { }` with `catch (Exception ex) { logger.Error($"Error in GetCanvasState: {ex.Message}", ex); }`. This enables debugging of state retrieval failures. Verify by triggering an error and confirming it is logged.
Silent error swallowing detected. An except clause that does pass or ... discards the exception with no log, no metric, and no trace. This blinds incident response and hides real failures.
Evidence
| 90 | { |
| 91 | return DisconnectRhinoNode(request); |
| 92 | } |
| 93 | } catch { |
| 94 | } |
| 95 | |
| 96 | return Task.FromResult(JsonConvert.SerializeObject(new { status = "error", message = "No active Grasshopper document" })); |
| 97 | } |
RemediationAI
The ConnectionManager.cs catch block in DisconnectRhinoNode silently swallows exceptions. Replace `catch { }` with `catch (Exception ex) { logger.Error($"Error in DisconnectNode: {ex.Message}", ex); }`. This enables monitoring of disconnection failures. Verify by triggering an error and confirming it is logged.
Silent error swallowing detected. An except clause that does pass or ... discards the exception with no log, no metric, and no trace. This blinds incident response and hides real failures.
Evidence
| 366 | { |
| 367 | return DeleteRhinoNode(nodeId); |
| 368 | } |
| 369 | } catch { |
| 370 | } |
| 371 | |
| 372 | return Task.FromResult(JsonConvert.SerializeObject(new { status = "error", message = "No active Grasshopper document" })); |
| 373 | } |
RemediationAI
The NodeManager.cs catch block in DeleteRhinoNode silently swallows exceptions. Replace `catch { }` with `catch (Exception ex) { logger.Error($"Error in DeleteNode: {ex.Message}", ex); }`. This enables auditing of deletion failures. Verify by triggering an error and confirming it is logged.
Silent error swallowing detected. An except clause that does pass or ... discards the exception with no log, no metric, and no trace. This blinds incident response and hides real failures.
Evidence
| 216 | { |
| 217 | return UpdateRhinoNode(request); |
| 218 | } |
| 219 | } catch { |
| 220 | } |
| 221 | |
| 222 | return Task.FromResult(JsonConvert.SerializeObject(new { status = "error", message = "No active Grasshopper document" })); |
| 223 | } |
RemediationAI
The NodeManager.cs catch block in UpdateRhinoNode silently swallows exceptions. Replace `catch { }` with `catch (Exception ex) { logger.Error($"Error in UpdateNode: {ex.Message}", ex); }`. This enables visibility into update failures. Verify by triggering an error and confirming it is logged.
Silent error swallowing detected. An except clause that does pass or ... discards the exception with no log, no metric, and no trace. This blinds incident response and hides real failures.
Evidence
| 124 | { |
| 125 | return CreateRhinoNode(request); |
| 126 | } |
| 127 | } catch { |
| 128 | } |
| 129 | |
| 130 | return Task.FromResult(JsonConvert.SerializeObject(new { status = "error", message = "No active Grasshopper document" })); |
| 131 | } |
RemediationAI
The NodeManager.cs catch block in CreateRhinoNode silently swallows exceptions. Replace `catch { }` with `catch (Exception ex) { logger.Error($"Error in CreateNode: {ex.Message}", ex); }`. This enables debugging of node creation failures. Verify by triggering an error and confirming it is logged.