Mostly safe — a couple of notes worth reading.
Scanned 5/3/2026, 7:07:59 PM·Cached result·Fast Scan·45 rules·How we decide ↗
AIVSS Score
Low
Severity Breakdown
0
critical
2
high
14
medium
0
low
MCP Server Information
Findings
This package receives a B grade with a safety score of 80/100 but carries notable security concerns, including 2 high-severity issues and 14 medium-severity findings concentrated in resource exhaustion and server configuration weaknesses. The resource exhaustion vulnerabilities could allow attackers to degrade performance or cause denial of service, while the server configuration issues suggest improper security hardening that may expose sensitive functionality. You should review the specific high-severity findings and implement compensating controls before deploying this in production environments.
No known CVEs found for this package or its dependencies.
Scan Details
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Fast scan found 16 findings using rule-based analysis. Upgrade for LLM consensus across 5 judges, AI-generated remediation, and cross-file taint analysis.
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16 of 16 findings
16 findings
TLS certificate verification is disabled on an outbound HTTP client. Any MITM in the network path can intercept and modify requests / responses — credentials, tokens, and tool output flow over a channel with no integrity guarantee. Python requests / httpx: drop `verify=False`. If the peer is using a private CA, set `verify="/path/to/ca-bundle.pem"` or configure the system trust store. Node TS axios / fetch: drop `rejectUnauthorized: false` from the agent / `httpsAgent` options. Same private-CA
Evidence
| 78 | host: proxyHost, |
| 79 | port: Number(proxyPort), |
| 80 | ca, |
| 81 | rejectUnauthorized: false, // Set to true if you want strict SSL |
| 82 | }); |
| 83 | } else { |
| 84 | // Proxy only |
Remediation
Drop the verify-disable flag. If the peer presents a private CA: - Python: pass `verify="/path/to/ca.pem"` or trust the system store - Node: `new https.Agent({ ca: fs.readFileSync("ca.pem") })` - Go: load the CA via `x509.NewCertPool().AppendCertsFromPEM(...)` and set `tls.Config.RootCAs` Self-signed certificates: import the cert into the OS trust chain rather than disabling verification per-call.
TLS certificate verification is disabled on an outbound HTTP client. Any MITM in the network path can intercept and modify requests / responses — credentials, tokens, and tool output flow over a channel with no integrity guarantee. Python requests / httpx: drop `verify=False`. If the peer is using a private CA, set `verify="/path/to/ca-bundle.pem"` or configure the system trust store. Node TS axios / fetch: drop `rejectUnauthorized: false` from the agent / `httpsAgent` options. Same private-CA
Evidence
| 88 | // CA only |
| 89 | return new https.Agent({ |
| 90 | ca: fs.readFileSync(caCertPath), |
| 91 | rejectUnauthorized: false, // Set to true for strict SSL |
| 92 | }); |
| 93 | } |
| 94 | // Default agent (no proxy, no CA) |
Remediation
Drop the verify-disable flag. If the peer presents a private CA: - Python: pass `verify="/path/to/ca.pem"` or trust the system store - Node: `new https.Agent({ ca: fs.readFileSync("ca.pem") })` - Go: load the CA via `x509.NewCertPool().AppendCertsFromPEM(...)` and set `tls.Config.RootCAs` Self-signed certificates: import the cert into the OS trust chain rather than disabling verification per-call.
Network / IO / subprocess call without an explicit timeout. A malicious or hung upstream (HTTP host, socket peer, child process) can pin threads, exhaust connection/process pools, and make the MCP server unresponsive. Always pass a bounded timeout. v2 extends v1 with subprocess coverage (R03 from the legacy readiness audit).
Evidence
| 18 | } |
| 19 | |
| 20 | const url = `${baseUrl}?${params.toString()}`; |
| 21 | const response = await fetch(url, { headers: { Authorization: authHeader } }); |
| 22 | |
| 23 | if (!response.ok) { |
| 24 | throw new Error(`Failed to fetch Percy token (status: ${response.status})`); |
Remediation
Pass timeout= on every call: - HTTP: `requests.get(url, timeout=5)`, `httpx.get(url, timeout=5.0)` - Node fetch: `AbortSignal.timeout(5000)` - Subprocess: `subprocess.run(["cmd"], timeout=30, check=True)` Pick a value short enough to fail fast and retry.
Network / IO / subprocess call without an explicit timeout. A malicious or hung upstream (HTTP host, socket peer, child process) can pin threads, exhaust connection/process pools, and make the MCP server unresponsive. Always pass a bounded timeout. v2 extends v1 with subprocess coverage (R03 from the legacy readiness audit).
Evidence
| 14 | const authHeader = |
| 15 | "Basic " + Buffer.from(`${username}:${accessKey}`).toString("base64"); |
| 16 | |
| 17 | const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { |
| 18 | headers: { |
| 19 | Authorization: authHeader, |
| 20 | "Content-Type": "application/json", |
Remediation
Pass timeout= on every call: - HTTP: `requests.get(url, timeout=5)`, `httpx.get(url, timeout=5.0)` - Node fetch: `AbortSignal.timeout(5000)` - Subprocess: `subprocess.run(["cmd"], timeout=30, check=True)` Pick a value short enough to fail fast and retry.
Network / IO / subprocess call without an explicit timeout. A malicious or hung upstream (HTTP host, socket peer, child process) can pin threads, exhaust connection/process pools, and make the MCP server unresponsive. Always pass a bounded timeout. v2 extends v1 with subprocess coverage (R03 from the legacy readiness audit).
Evidence
| 104 | const url = baseUrl.replace("{testId}", testId.toString()); |
| 105 | |
| 106 | try { |
| 107 | const response = await fetch(url, { headers }); |
| 108 | |
| 109 | if (!response.ok) { |
| 110 | return { |
Remediation
Pass timeout= on every call: - HTTP: `requests.get(url, timeout=5)`, `httpx.get(url, timeout=5.0)` - Node fetch: `AbortSignal.timeout(5000)` - Subprocess: `subprocess.run(["cmd"], timeout=30, check=True)` Pick a value short enough to fail fast and retry.
Network / IO / subprocess call without an explicit timeout. A malicious or hung upstream (HTTP host, socket peer, child process) can pin threads, exhaust connection/process pools, and make the MCP server unresponsive. Always pass a bounded timeout. v2 extends v1 with subprocess coverage (R03 from the legacy readiness audit).
Evidence
| 180 | inProgressCases.map(async (tc) => { |
| 181 | try { |
| 182 | const pollUrl = baseUrl.replace("{testId}", tc.id.toString()); |
| 183 | const response = await fetch(pollUrl, { headers }); |
| 184 | if (!response.ok) { |
| 185 | const errorText = await response.text(); |
| 186 | tc.state = RCAState.LOG_FETCH_ERROR; |
Remediation
Pass timeout= on every call: - HTTP: `requests.get(url, timeout=5)`, `httpx.get(url, timeout=5.0)` - Node fetch: `AbortSignal.timeout(5000)` - Subprocess: `subprocess.run(["cmd"], timeout=30, check=True)` Pick a value short enough to fail fast and retry.
MCP tool input schema exposes an unconstrained string/any field with a risky name (command/query/sql/code/script/url/path/expr/ eval). Any caller can pass arbitrary values, which typically widens the tool's blast radius well beyond its intent. Narrow the schema with `.enum()`, `.regex()`, `.max()`, `Literal[...]`, Pydantic `Field(max_length=..., pattern=...)`, or a JSON Schema `enum` / `pattern` / `maxLength`.
Evidence
| 463 | .describe( |
| 464 | "Authentication type: 'form' for form-based auth, 'basic' for HTTP basic auth", |
| 465 | ), |
| 466 | url: z.string().describe("URL of the authentication page"), |
| 467 | username: z.string().describe("Username for authentication"), |
| 468 | password: z.string().describe("Password for authentication"), |
| 469 | usernameSelector: z |
Remediation
Shape the schema to the tool's actual intent: - Zod: chain `.enum([...])`, `.regex(/.../)`, or `.max(n)`; prefer `z.enum([...])` or `z.literal(...)` when the value set is small. - Pydantic: use `Literal["a", "b"]` or `Field(max_length=..., pattern=r"...")`. - JSON Schema: add `"enum"`, `"pattern"`, or `"maxLength"` to the property. An overbroad schema is an "overpowered tool" — the model has nothing to prevent it from calling the tool with input far beyond what the tool's prose contract
GitHub Actions `uses:` reference is not pinned to a 40-character commit SHA. Tags (`@v4`) and branches (`@main`) are mutable — a compromised maintainer or a tag rewrite can substitute malicious code into your CI pipeline silently. Pin to a SHA: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab`. For readability, include the version as a trailing comment: `# v4.1.1`. Tools like `pinact` / `ratchet` automate this. Allowed unpinned forms (excluded by the rule): - Local actions `.
Evidence
| 16 | fetch-depth: 0 |
| 17 | |
| 18 | - name: "Set up Node.js" |
| 19 | uses: actions/setup-node@v3 |
| 20 | with: |
| 21 | node-version: 22.x |
| 22 | registry-url: "https://registry.npmjs.org/" |
Remediation
Pin every `uses:` to a 40-character commit SHA. Trailing comment with the version helps reviewers: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab # v4.1.1` Automate the migration with `pinact` (https://github.com/suzuki-shunsuke/pinact) or `ratchet` (https://github.com/sethvargo/ratchet). Add a `pinact run --check` pre-commit hook so future PRs stay pinned. Re-pin when the action releases a new version — Dependabot can do this automatically with `version-update-strategy: inc
GitHub Actions `uses:` reference is not pinned to a 40-character commit SHA. Tags (`@v4`) and branches (`@main`) are mutable — a compromised maintainer or a tag rewrite can substitute malicious code into your CI pipeline silently. Pin to a SHA: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab`. For readability, include the version as a trailing comment: `# v4.1.1`. Tools like `pinact` / `ratchet` automate this. Allowed unpinned forms (excluded by the rule): - Local actions `.
Evidence
| 14 | node-version: [22.x] |
| 15 | |
| 16 | steps: |
| 17 | - uses: actions/checkout@v3 |
| 18 | - name: Use Node.js ${{ matrix.node-version }} |
| 19 | uses: actions/setup-node@v3 |
| 20 | with: |
Remediation
Pin every `uses:` to a 40-character commit SHA. Trailing comment with the version helps reviewers: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab # v4.1.1` Automate the migration with `pinact` (https://github.com/suzuki-shunsuke/pinact) or `ratchet` (https://github.com/sethvargo/ratchet). Add a `pinact run --check` pre-commit hook so future PRs stay pinned. Re-pin when the action releases a new version — Dependabot can do this automatically with `version-update-strategy: inc
GitHub Actions `uses:` reference is not pinned to a 40-character commit SHA. Tags (`@v4`) and branches (`@main`) are mutable — a compromised maintainer or a tag rewrite can substitute malicious code into your CI pipeline silently. Pin to a SHA: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab`. For readability, include the version as a trailing comment: `# v4.1.1`. Tools like `pinact` / `ratchet` automate this. Allowed unpinned forms (excluded by the rule): - Local actions `.
Evidence
| 11 | runs-on: ubuntu-latest |
| 12 | steps: |
| 13 | - name: "Checkout source code" |
| 14 | uses: actions/checkout@v2 |
| 15 | with: |
| 16 | fetch-depth: 0 |
Remediation
Pin every `uses:` to a 40-character commit SHA. Trailing comment with the version helps reviewers: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab # v4.1.1` Automate the migration with `pinact` (https://github.com/suzuki-shunsuke/pinact) or `ratchet` (https://github.com/sethvargo/ratchet). Add a `pinact run --check` pre-commit hook so future PRs stay pinned. Re-pin when the action releases a new version — Dependabot can do this automatically with `version-update-strategy: inc
GitHub Actions `uses:` reference is not pinned to a 40-character commit SHA. Tags (`@v4`) and branches (`@main`) are mutable — a compromised maintainer or a tag rewrite can substitute malicious code into your CI pipeline silently. Pin to a SHA: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab`. For readability, include the version as a trailing comment: `# v4.1.1`. Tools like `pinact` / `ratchet` automate this. Allowed unpinned forms (excluded by the rule): - Local actions `.
Evidence
| 104 | NODE_AUTH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }} |
| 105 | |
| 106 | - name: "Create GitHub Release" |
| 107 | uses: actions/create-release@v1 |
| 108 | with: |
| 109 | tag_name: ${{ steps.get_version.outputs.version }} |
| 110 | release_name: ${{ steps.get_version.outputs.version }} |
Remediation
Pin every `uses:` to a 40-character commit SHA. Trailing comment with the version helps reviewers: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab # v4.1.1` Automate the migration with `pinact` (https://github.com/suzuki-shunsuke/pinact) or `ratchet` (https://github.com/sethvargo/ratchet). Add a `pinact run --check` pre-commit hook so future PRs stay pinned. Re-pin when the action releases a new version — Dependabot can do this automatically with `version-update-strategy: inc
GitHub Actions `uses:` reference is not pinned to a 40-character commit SHA. Tags (`@v4`) and branches (`@main`) are mutable — a compromised maintainer or a tag rewrite can substitute malicious code into your CI pipeline silently. Pin to a SHA: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab`. For readability, include the version as a trailing comment: `# v4.1.1`. Tools like `pinact` / `ratchet` automate this. Allowed unpinned forms (excluded by the rule): - Local actions `.
Evidence
| 17 | uses: actions/checkout@v5 |
| 18 | |
| 19 | - name: Setup Node.js |
| 20 | uses: actions/setup-node@v5 |
| 21 | with: |
| 22 | node-version: "lts/*" |
Remediation
Pin every `uses:` to a 40-character commit SHA. Trailing comment with the version helps reviewers: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab # v4.1.1` Automate the migration with `pinact` (https://github.com/suzuki-shunsuke/pinact) or `ratchet` (https://github.com/sethvargo/ratchet). Add a `pinact run --check` pre-commit hook so future PRs stay pinned. Re-pin when the action releases a new version — Dependabot can do this automatically with `version-update-strategy: inc
GitHub Actions `uses:` reference is not pinned to a 40-character commit SHA. Tags (`@v4`) and branches (`@main`) are mutable — a compromised maintainer or a tag rewrite can substitute malicious code into your CI pipeline silently. Pin to a SHA: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab`. For readability, include the version as a trailing comment: `# v4.1.1`. Tools like `pinact` / `ratchet` automate this. Allowed unpinned forms (excluded by the rule): - Local actions `.
Evidence
| 14 | steps: |
| 15 | - name: Checkout code |
| 16 | uses: actions/checkout@v5 |
| 17 | |
| 18 | - name: Setup Node.js |
| 19 | uses: actions/setup-node@v5 |
Remediation
Pin every `uses:` to a 40-character commit SHA. Trailing comment with the version helps reviewers: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab # v4.1.1` Automate the migration with `pinact` (https://github.com/suzuki-shunsuke/pinact) or `ratchet` (https://github.com/sethvargo/ratchet). Add a `pinact run --check` pre-commit hook so future PRs stay pinned. Re-pin when the action releases a new version — Dependabot can do this automatically with `version-update-strategy: inc
GitHub Actions `uses:` reference is not pinned to a 40-character commit SHA. Tags (`@v4`) and branches (`@main`) are mutable — a compromised maintainer or a tag rewrite can substitute malicious code into your CI pipeline silently. Pin to a SHA: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab`. For readability, include the version as a trailing comment: `# v4.1.1`. Tools like `pinact` / `ratchet` automate this. Allowed unpinned forms (excluded by the rule): - Local actions `.
Evidence
| 11 | runs-on: ubuntu-latest |
| 12 | steps: |
| 13 | - name: "Checkout source code" |
| 14 | uses: actions/checkout@v4 |
| 15 | with: |
| 16 | fetch-depth: 0 |
Remediation
Pin every `uses:` to a 40-character commit SHA. Trailing comment with the version helps reviewers: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab # v4.1.1` Automate the migration with `pinact` (https://github.com/suzuki-shunsuke/pinact) or `ratchet` (https://github.com/sethvargo/ratchet). Add a `pinact run --check` pre-commit hook so future PRs stay pinned. Re-pin when the action releases a new version — Dependabot can do this automatically with `version-update-strategy: inc
GitHub Actions `uses:` reference is not pinned to a 40-character commit SHA. Tags (`@v4`) and branches (`@main`) are mutable — a compromised maintainer or a tag rewrite can substitute malicious code into your CI pipeline silently. Pin to a SHA: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab`. For readability, include the version as a trailing comment: `# v4.1.1`. Tools like `pinact` / `ratchet` automate this. Allowed unpinned forms (excluded by the rule): - Local actions `.
Evidence
| 16 | steps: |
| 17 | - uses: actions/checkout@v3 |
| 18 | - name: Use Node.js ${{ matrix.node-version }} |
| 19 | uses: actions/setup-node@v3 |
| 20 | with: |
| 21 | node-version: ${{ matrix.node-version }} |
| 22 | - run: npm ci |
Remediation
Pin every `uses:` to a 40-character commit SHA. Trailing comment with the version helps reviewers: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab # v4.1.1` Automate the migration with `pinact` (https://github.com/suzuki-shunsuke/pinact) or `ratchet` (https://github.com/sethvargo/ratchet). Add a `pinact run --check` pre-commit hook so future PRs stay pinned. Re-pin when the action releases a new version — Dependabot can do this automatically with `version-update-strategy: inc
GitHub Actions `uses:` reference is not pinned to a 40-character commit SHA. Tags (`@v4`) and branches (`@main`) are mutable — a compromised maintainer or a tag rewrite can substitute malicious code into your CI pipeline silently. Pin to a SHA: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab`. For readability, include the version as a trailing comment: `# v4.1.1`. Tools like `pinact` / `ratchet` automate this. Allowed unpinned forms (excluded by the rule): - Local actions `.
Evidence
| 16 | fetch-depth: 0 |
| 17 | |
| 18 | - name: "Set up Node.js" |
| 19 | uses: actions/setup-node@v4 |
| 20 | with: |
| 21 | node-version: 22.x |
| 22 | registry-url: "https://registry.npmjs.org/" |
Remediation
Pin every `uses:` to a 40-character commit SHA. Trailing comment with the version helps reviewers: `uses: actions/checkout@8e5e7e5ab8b370d6c329ec480221332ada57f0ab # v4.1.1` Automate the migration with `pinact` (https://github.com/suzuki-shunsuke/pinact) or `ratchet` (https://github.com/sethvargo/ratchet). Add a `pinact run --check` pre-commit hook so future PRs stay pinned. Re-pin when the action releases a new version — Dependabot can do this automatically with `version-update-strategy: inc