github · whatsapp-mcp7d6a06dcdce1

Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure — useful recon for attackers.

except json.JSONDecodeError:

        return False, f"Error parsing response: {response.text}"

    except Exception as e:

        return False, f"Unexpected error: {str(e)}"

def download_media(message_id: str, chat_jid: str) -> Optional[str]:

    """Download media from a message and return the local file path.

Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure — useful recon for attackers.

return False, f"Error: HTTP {response.status_code} - {response.text}"

    except requests.RequestException as e:

        return False, f"Request error: {str(e)}"

    except json.JSONDecodeError:

        return False, f"Error parsing response: {response.text}"

    except Exception as e:

Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure — useful recon for attackers.

return False, f"Error: HTTP {response.status_code} - {response.text}"

    except requests.RequestException as e:

        return False, f"Request error: {str(e)}"

    except json.JSONDecodeError:

        return False, f"Error parsing response: {response.text}"

    except Exception as e:

Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure — useful recon for attackers.

return False, f"Error: HTTP {response.status_code} - {response.text}"

    except requests.RequestException as e:

        return False, f"Request error: {str(e)}"

    except json.JSONDecodeError:

        return False, f"Error parsing response: {response.text}"

    except Exception as e:

Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure — useful recon for attackers.

except json.JSONDecodeError:

        return False, f"Error parsing response: {response.text}"

    except Exception as e:

        return False, f"Unexpected error: {str(e)}"

def send_audio_message(recipient: str, media_path: str) -> Tuple[bool, str]:

    try:

Full exception detail or stack trace returned to the caller. Leaking tracebacks exposes internal paths, library versions, and query structure — useful recon for attackers.

except json.JSONDecodeError:

        return False, f"Error parsing response: {response.text}"

    except Exception as e:

        return False, f"Unexpected error: {str(e)}"

def send_file(recipient: str, media_path: str) -> Tuple[bool, str]:

    try:

Network / IO / subprocess call without an explicit timeout. A malicious or hung upstream (HTTP host, socket peer, child process) can pin threads, exhaust connection/process pools, and make the MCP server unresponsive. Always pass a bounded timeout. v2 extends v1 with subprocess coverage (R03 from the legacy readiness audit).

"media_path": media_path

        }

        response = requests.post(url, json=payload)

        # Check if the request was successful

        if response.status_code == 200:

Network / IO / subprocess call without an explicit timeout. A malicious or hung upstream (HTTP host, socket peer, child process) can pin threads, exhaust connection/process pools, and make the MCP server unresponsive. Always pass a bounded timeout. v2 extends v1 with subprocess coverage (R03 from the legacy readiness audit).

"media_path": media_path

        }

        response = requests.post(url, json=payload)

        # Check if the request was successful

        if response.status_code == 200:

Network / IO / subprocess call without an explicit timeout. A malicious or hung upstream (HTTP host, socket peer, child process) can pin threads, exhaust connection/process pools, and make the MCP server unresponsive. Always pass a bounded timeout. v2 extends v1 with subprocess coverage (R03 from the legacy readiness audit).

"chat_jid": chat_jid

        }

        response = requests.post(url, json=payload)

        if response.status_code == 200:

            result = response.json()

Network / IO / subprocess call without an explicit timeout. A malicious or hung upstream (HTTP host, socket peer, child process) can pin threads, exhaust connection/process pools, and make the MCP server unresponsive. Always pass a bounded timeout. v2 extends v1 with subprocess coverage (R03 from the legacy readiness audit).

"message": message,

        }

        response = requests.post(url, json=payload)

        # Check if the request was successful

        if response.status_code == 200: